Genocidal Rape, Enforced Impregnation, and the Discourse of Serbian National Identity by Takševa, Tatjana
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 
ISSN 1481-4374 
Purdue University Press ©Purdue University 
Volume 17 (2015) Issue 3 Article 2 
Genocidal Rape, Enforced Impregnation, and the Discourse of Serbian National Identity 
Tatjana Takševa 
Saint Mary's University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb 
 Part of the American Studies Commons, Comparative Literature Commons, Education Commons, European Languages and 
Societies Commons, Feminist, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Commons, Other Arts and Humanities Commons, Other Film and 
Media Studies Commons, Reading and Language Commons, Rhetoric and Composition Commons, Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Commons, Television Commons, and the Theatre and Performance Studies Commons 
Dedicated to the dissemination of scholarly and professional information, Purdue University Press selects, develops, and distributes 
quality resources in several key subject areas for which its parent university is famous, including business, technology, health, 
veterinary medicine, and other selected disciplines in the humanities and sciences. 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access learned journal in the humanities and 
social sciences, publishes new scholarship following tenets of the discipline of comparative literature and the field of cultural 
studies designated as "comparative cultural studies." Publications in the journal are indexed in the Annual Bibliography of English 
Language and Literature (Chadwyck-Healey), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters ISI), the Humanities Index 
(Wilson), Humanities International Complete (EBSCO), the International Bibliography of the Modern Language Association of 
America, and Scopus (Elsevier). The journal is affiliated with the Purdue University Press monograph series of Books in Comparative 
Cultural Studies. Contact: <clcweb@purdue.edu> 
Recommended Citation 
Takševa, Tatjana. "Genocidal Rape, Enforced Impregnation, and the Discourse of Serbian National Identity." CLCWeb: 
Comparative Literature and Culture 17.3 (2015): <https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.2638> 
This text has been double-blind peer reviewed by 2+1 experts in the field. 
The above text, published by Purdue University Press ©Purdue University, has been downloaded 763 times as of 11/
07/19. 
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact 
epubs@purdue.edu for additional information. 
This is an Open Access journal. This means that it uses a funding model that does not charge readers or their institutions for 
access. Readers may freely read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of articles. This journal is covered 
under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
   UNIVERSITY PRESS <http://www.thepress.purdue.edu> 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture  
 
ISSN 1481-4374 <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb> 
Purdue University Press ©Purdue University 
 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access learned journal in the 
humanities and social sciences, publishes new scholarship following tenets of the discipline of comparative 
literature and the field of cultural studies designated as "comparative cultural studies." In addition to the 
publication of articles, the journal publishes review articles of scholarly books and publishes research material in its 
Library Series. Publications in the journal are indexed in the Annual Bibliography of English Language and 
Literature (Chadwyck-Healey), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters ISI), the Humanities 
Index (Wilson), Humanities International Complete (EBSCO), the International Bibliography of the Modern Langua-
ge Association of America, and Scopus (Elsevier). The journal is affiliated with the Purdue University Press monog-
raph series of Books in Comparative Cultural Studies. Contact: <clcweb@purdue.edu> 
 
 
Volume 17 Issue 3 (September 2015) Article 2 
Tatjana Takševa,  
"Genocidal Rape, Enforced Impregnation, and the Discourse of Serbian National Identity" 
<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol17/iss3/2> 
 
Contents of CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 17.3 (2015) 




Abstract: In her article "Genocidal Rape, Enforced Impregnation, and the Discourse of Serbian Na-
tional Identity" Tatjana Takševa analyzes two main processes which contributed to the systematic 
rape and enforced impregnation of Bosniak women during the Balkan conflict: the discourse of Serbian 
nationalism articulated in response to the sexual violence that took place in Kosovo preceding the war 
and the simultaneous diminishing and downgrading of women's political and social autonomy on all 
territories of the former Yugoslavia. Based on statements in narratives of Bosniak women rape survi-
vors, Takševa argues that these ideologically motivated processes combined to revive, inflame, and 
militarize long-standing Serbian stereotypes about Muslims and the supposed threat they represent. 
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Tatjana TAKŠEVA  
 
Genocidal Rape, Enforced Impregnation, and the Discourse of Serbian National Identity 
 
Between 1991 and 1995 Bosnia was one of the deadliest regions in the wars triggered by the disinte-
gration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under the banner of the old Yugoslav army all 
sides, but particularly Serbian nationalist, forces engaged in campaigns of ethnic cleansing of Bosnians 
(also Bosniaks, Bošnjaci) of Moslem faith and ethnic heritage. A significant aspect of this strategy was 
the systematic use of rape and enforced impregnation of Bosniak women. It is estimated that between 
25,000 and 40,000 Bosniak women were victims of rape and enforced impregnation released from the 
rape camps only after their pregnancies had progressed beyond the possibility of a safe abortion 
(Sharratt; Skjelsbaek; Erjavec and Volčič). In narrative accounts of their experiences, some of the 
rape survivors reported being told by Serbian soldiers that the purpose behind the rape was to im-
pregnate them with a Serb child or "little Chetnik," that is, children assumed to become nationalist 
Serbs who would later turn against their biological mothers. There is consensus in scholarship about 
the genocidal intention behind enforced impregnation whose purpose was manifold: to create the re-
jection of raped mothers and their children and thus destabilize their social and ethnic group to per-
suade, to prepare victims to hate and eventually to destroy their own children or be destroyed by 
them, and to create a situation where the paternal lineage of the child -- seen as decisive in determin-
ing ethnic and national identity -- would perpetuate and increase the ethnic group of the aggressor 
(see Allen; Erjavec and Volčič; Sharratt; Snyder, Gabbard, May, Zulcic).  
The massive scale on which these rapes were taking place and the existence of rape camps --
improvised, but purposefully utilized spaces where the women, if they were not killed, were kept and 
abused for several months -- suggested even during early investigations in 1992 and 1993 that there 
was a politically motivated agenda behind the acts (see Allen). In the report submitted to the secre-
tary General of the UN by a UN appointed commission of experts, it is stated that practices of ethnic 
cleansing including systemic rapes conducted by Bosnian Serb and Serbian military units in Bosnia 
"were not coincidental, sporadic or carried out by disorganized groups of bands of civilians who could 
not be controlled" but show "the existence of an element of superior direction" (Allen 45). It should 
not be overlooked that there were also Croatian women who were raped by Serbian paramilitaries as 
part of this campaign, as well as Serbian women who were raped by Croatian and Bosniak soldiers. 
The Commission for War Crimes created in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia claimed that in 1993 
there were 800 Serbian women raped in Muslim detention camps whose personal narratives also indi-
cate that they were victimized owing to their ethnic affiliation (see Nikolić-Ristanović; Stiglmayer). 
Throughout histories of conflict, wartime rape has long been acknowledged as a common occurrence. 
Women's bodies have often been seen as an essential instrument of war strategy and these "bodies" 
often constitute the symbolic and actual battlefield of the conquest of an ethnic domain in "an endless 
construction of women as the universal Other" (Papić 156). However, the 1993 report to the UN in its 
concluding remarks reiterates that Bosniak women were the special target of Serbian military and 
paramilitary units: "While the team of experts has found victims among all ethnic groups involved in 
the conflict, the majority of the rapes that they have documented had been committed by Serb forces 
against Muslim women from Bosnia and Herzegovina" (Mazowiecki <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G95/129/00/PDF/G9512900.pdf?OpenElement>). 
The women's cultural and national identity appears to have been a crucial factor in the particular 
type of violence inflicted upon them, despite remarks such as Beverley Allen makes in her 1996 book 
Rape Warfare that "enforced pregnancy as a method of genocide makes sense only if you are ignorant 
of genetics. No baby born from such a crime will be only Serb" (87) and further commenting on how 
"the Serb policy erases the victims' cultural identity and treats her as nothing more than a kind of 
biological box" (88). While it is true that the children born of such rape are not only Serb, their own 
narratives reveal that regardless of the fact they have been raised by their Bosniak mothers in Bosniak 
communities, they are seen as neither Serb nor fully Bosniak. I have written elsewhere about what it 
means to raise a child born of wartime rape in today's Bosnia and the strategies many mothers adopt 
in negotiating the various forms of ostracism and victimization they and their children face in the 
mothers' community (see Takševa and Sgoutas). The fact that the children are being raised by Bosni-
ak mothers in Bosniak communities does not mean that the politics of their identity in those communi-
ties is any less complicated. While the Serb paramilitaries' injunction to the Bosniak women was in-
formed by a profoundly patriarchal notion that the child will automatically carry the nationality of the 
father, what was also at stake for them is defining and policing of group membership. Biology is an 
important marker of identity, but identity is more than biology, as much of it is socially constructed 
(see Goodhart; Weitsman). The lived experience of Bosniak rape survivors and their children indicates 
that one cannot just join any community just because one wants to, and one is never part of any 
community solely because possesses (some of) its requisite traits (see Takševa and Sgoutas; see also 
Goodhart). What matters in how identity is enacted politically and perceived is the socially constructed 
significance of the biological marker of identity, namely, how the children are perceived by their com-
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munity and sometimes by their own mothers. This is evident in the wars Southern Europe where vio-
lence was used to inscribe and virtually produce the differences between various ethnic groups (see 
Zarkov). Based on recorded personal narratives of the women rape survivors and those of their chil-
dren, my aim is to shed light on the specific ways in which the rapists' injunction is implicated in Ser-
bian nationalist politics of identity leading up to the war. I argue that several specific cultural, socio-
political, and psychological factors inform it. 
There are not many recorded personal narratives of Bosniak women rape survivors. The topic re-
mains a taboo in Bosnian society; the majority of women who were impregnated in this manner during 
the war either sought abortions or gave their children up for adoption right after birth. In 1993 the 
Bosnian government, concerned about the birthrate of the country after about 200,000 people were 
killed in the war, issued a general ban on international adoption with the result that centers for social 
work took the responsibility for placing children in local orphanages or organizing domestic adoption 
(see Daniel-Wrabetz). Some women, finding themselves at the edge of sanity and endurance, commit-
ted infanticide. There is a small number of women who chose to keep the children born of these expe-
riences and most do not want to talk about what happened as a way of protecting themselves and 
their children from re-traumatization and victimization and as a way to redefine their social identities 
(see Skjelsbaek). The narratives that do exist, however, highlight the women's sense of being target-
ed because of their ethnicity. Danira, a 44 year-old rape survivor, speaks of her ordeal remembering 
that the violence done to her was accompanied by the perpetrators' calling her "a bad word for a Mus-
lim woman, that I was dirty" (Skjelsbaek, "Victim" 382). Another survivor, 20 year-old Hasiba, re-
counts having been forced to kiss a big Serbian cross and cross herself three times in Serbian Ortho-
dox style in order to "convert" before being raped, while Ifeta was told that "it would be an honour for 
a Muslim woman to give birth to a Serbian child" (Stiglmayer 118-28). The staggering number of Bos-
niak women who were held prisoners in the rape camps, forcibly impregnated and released only after 
it was too late to abort suggests that there was something particular about the perception of Bosniak 
women's religious, cultural and ethnic identity that seemed to account for their systematic abuse at 
Serb hands (see Erjavec and Volčič; Skjelsbaek; Snyder, Gabbard, May, Zulcic). 
Many of the violent scenarios recounted by the women are played out in relation to their and their 
perpetrators' ethnic identity. One survivor narrative records the intertwining of misogynist, masculinist 
enactment of power, and ethnicity: "I was naïve in thinking that the Serbs wouldn't rape me again. 
The next one called himself 'top gun'… He tied me up with his belt and dribbled beer on my body. 
While he was raping me, he repeated vulgar language into my ear. At the end he didn't forget to spit 
at me. 'It's your price from Top Gun, you Muslim whore' he told me … I thought he was Serbian, from 
Serbia. I recognized his dialect as being from Serbia" (Vranić 141). Other Bosniak women survivors' 
told about how "they attacked women and girls in front of the men, brothers, and sons. Nasty people, 
those Orthodox … no women were exempt due to pregnancy from rape and maltreatment … they con-
stantly told us that we had to bear small Chetniks" (Vranić 157-302). One of the testimonies was pro-
vided by a young woman who before the war had not declared herself as belonging to any ethnic 
group, but as a Yugoslav, but who after being repeatedly raped and brutalized identified herself as 
Bosniak. Another woman survivor who gave birth to a child conceived of wartime rape was able to 
identify her multiple attackers by name because she met them before as members of the Serbian 
Democratic Party: "while they were repeatedly raping me, they were eating a feast of food and drink. 
They 'feted' me with offenses, cursing and beating me with a stick … while he was tyrannizing me, he 
said that he loved bleeding Muslims … When they noticed that I was pregnant, they told me that I 
must bear the little Chetnik. After that time, only two men raped me every night, not four or five 
which was usual before" (Vranić 174-75). A thirteen-year old boy, Ferid from Foča, spoke about the 
rape of his younger sister after the Serb occupation of his town and remembered being told a 'secret' 
by his schoolmate that "any Chetnik could do 'it' to any Muslim girl, and that nobody could help" (Ferid 
qtd. in Vranić 278). 
The outbreak of war in Yugoslavia and the particular treatment of Bosniak women during the war 
find their meaning in the evocation of past ethnic conflicts, as well as nationalist discourses whose 
destructive power lies in their destabilization of the previous perception and intelligibility between 
past, present, and future (see Papić). I suggest that there were two main processes which contributed 
to the systematic rape and enforced impregnation of Bosniak women: 1) the discourse of Serbian na-
tionalism articulated in response to the sexual violence that took place in Kosovo preceding the war, a 
discourse promoted by Serbian politicians, some intellectuals, and the media to the point where it 
became widely accepted as true and based on common sense and 2) the gradual and simultaneous 
downgrading of women's political and social autonomy on all territories of the former Yugoslavia, while 
emphasizing and reconfiguring women's role in terms of their duty as mothers of the nation. In rela-
tion to Bosniak women specifically, both of these ideologically motivated processes combined to re-
vive, inflame, and militarize long-standing Serbian stereotypes about Muslims and the supposed threat 
they represent, creating a climate that facilitated the particular kind of violence inflicted on Bosniak 
women. Further, the verbal and conceptual connection that the perpetrators made between Bosniak 
women's reproductive capacity on the one hand and nationhood based on ethnicity on the other does 
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not imply the complete ideological obliteration of the mothers' own cultural and religious identity. Un-
derpinning the act of enforced impregnation is the assertion of power and superiority of one group 
over another, enacted via gendered and sexualized means (rape as a form of violence done by those 
who are stronger to those who are perceived as weaker). The perpetrators used the mothers' cultural 
and religious identity for a battle that she is likely to lose through attempting to mother "a child of the 
enemy group." The violent act assumes that women as mothers represent a symbolic yet politically 
voiceless extension of the nation, a repository of group identity itself that she can reproduce but that 
is in all other ways actively transmitted by men and masculinist, patriarchal institutions. The injury to 
the woman as mother implies injury to the other, namely the group whose symbol she is (on the trope 
of the mother as nation, see, e.g., Mosse; Parker, Russo, Sommer, Yaeger). In the years surrounding 
the war, this symbolic contiguity between woman as mother and nation as the motherland that she is 
seen to embody was newly revived within the inflammatory nationalist rhetoric used by political and 
clerical leaders in the Balkans. The Serbian nationalist script and the gender roles embedded in such 
an ideology are best understood as masculinist projects in which women are relegated to roles reflect-
ing masculinist notions of femininity and of women's "proper place" (Nagel 24; see also Albanese; 
Milic), but also as nationalist projects whose desired success depended on creating and reinforcing 
group boundaries here delineated along ethnic lines. 
In the years leading up to the war, there were two public discourses which transformed women in 
the Serbian cultural and nationalist imaginary into tools and instruments of nationhood and into enti-
ties with diminished or obliterated human autonomy and agency. One was the discourse surrounding 
"nationalist" rape in Kosovo in the 1980s that specifically foregrounded the use of rape in support of 
the Albanian nationalist cause in mobilizing support for nationalism in Serbia. The other was the Ser-
bian radical nationalist discourse that was in part shaped through the gradual restriction of women's 
rights and the re-traditionalization of women's roles. Because the debate over Kosovo was a highly 
politicized public issue in the 1980s, accusations of Albanian rape of Serbs in Kosovo were an im-
portant political factor in the development of Serbian nationalism. Populated by a majority of Albani-
ans and made into an autonomous unit within the Republic of Serbia in 1974, nationalist tensions in 
Kosovo simmered until 1981 when Albanian demonstrations called for a "Kosova Republic," followed 
by further disturbances and agitation, all met with federal repression (see Bracewell). At the time, 
discussions of rape were used to create the perception of Serbian national victimization at Muslim 
hands, thus legitimizing the emergence of and support for militant Serbian nationalism. Kosovar Serbs 
who emigrated from the province to Serbia in large numbers brought with them tales of Albanian 
abuses of power, the sly takeover of their homes through a high birth rate, and a virtual "occupation" 
of what Serbs identify as Serbian ancestral land. 
The incidents of "nationalist rape" in Kosovo were represented as a threat to Serbian identity and 
survival. By 1985 issues of nationally motivated sexual violence in Kosovo perpetrated by Albanians 
against Serbian women were widely publicized in the Serbian media. In the five years before the out-
break of the war, Serbian newspapers featured almost daily discussions about alleged rapes of Serbian 
women by Kosovar Albanians and the violation of all Serbs that these rapes represented (see Lilly and 
Irvine 112). While there is lack of conclusive evidence to support claims of deliberate Albanian cam-
paign of sexual violence against Serbs, the Serbian nationalist intelligentsia focused attention on rape 
as an aspect of the threat to the Serbian population in Kosovo. Intellectuals, politicians, and the me-
dia, headed by Milošević himself, actively supported the hysteria over popular accounts by represent-
ing as rape narratives that often blurred the line between rape and other forms of violence. A relevant 
aspect of the Albanian campaign of nationally-motivated sexual violence against Serbs is that it was 
purportedly directed toward men, as well as women. The case of Djordje Martinović, a Serb living in 
Kosovo, was often used to illustrate this trend. In May of 1985 he appeared in the hospital of a pri-
marily Albanian town with punctured large intestine due to a bottle wedged up his rectum. He report-
ed being attacked by two hooded Albanians who tied and drugged him before assaulting him (see 
Bracewell 563). This case helped spread the view that aggressive Albanian men seek not only to rape 
Serbian girls and women and thus enlarge and perpetuate their national claims to Kosovo, but also to 
emasculate and thus subordinate and enslave Serbian men, bringing into question the prevailing gen-
der hierarchy and precipitating a crisis of Serbian masculinity. Significantly, however, in contrast to 
the reports about the Martinović case, the sexual violence against women in nationalist interpretations 
was less about the experience of the victims themselves than about the challenge to Serbian mascu-
line pride: in these cases it was not the injury to the victim that counted, but the injury to the nation 
(Bracewell 571-73). Politicians exploited this link to create an aggressive nationalist program that 
could redeem both national dignity and Serbian masculine honour, and structured Serbian nationalism 
with reference to an aggressive and competitive masculine idea (tough, dominant, heterosexual) and 
an articulation of its complementary feminine one (passive, maternal, vulnerable) (Bracewell 569-70). 
The other important element in building the new Serbian nationalist program was that nationalist Ser-
bian rhetoric had long equated the predominantly Muslim Albanians in Kosovo and in an extended 
stereotype Muslim populations in general to the Ottoman Turks (who defeated the Serbs in the battle 
of Kosovo in 1389 followed by a five-century long occupation of Southern Europe). Various cultural 
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stereotypes which surface consistently in Serbian folklore and humor revolve around Muslims where 
both Albanians and Bosniaks are represented as stupid, lazy, backward, religiously fanatical, and brut-
ish who occupy menial positions in society (see, e.g., Panjeta). Furthermore, the stereotypes about 
Bosniaks are infused with references to their moral and ethical inferiority often due to the fact that 
they converted to Islam under pressure from Ottoman policy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries, thus seen to have betrayed the religion and culture of their Christian ancestors. In the newly 
articulated nationalist discourse, the fall of Serbia into Ottoman hands was revived and recast in the 
present-day scenario and the view that the Albanian bid for independence has placed the heroic Serbi-
an nation in an unnatural position, rendered it emasculated and degraded, forced to submit to an un-
worthy culture (see Bracewell). 
Alongside the equation posited between Bosniak populations and the Ottoman Turks who occupied 
Serbia in the past, the Serbian nationalist government propagated a form of panic related to falling 
Serbian birthrates compared against consistently rising Albanian ones. Rising birthrates among Muslim 
populations were contrasted to the falling birthrates of Serbs and represented as another way in which 
Muslim populations threatened the Serb nation, adding fuel to the campaign for Serbian demographic 
renewal. This rhetorical and cultural framework provoked ethnic hatred and produced cultural stereo-
types for the purposes of constructing the enemy's otherness through clearly demarcated lines of reli-
gion, ethnicity, culture, and gender that had up until then existed in a fluid state (see Papić 155). Ac-
cording to the 1981 Serbian census, there were nearly 14% of Albanians living in the country, consti-
tuting the largest growing minority, plus 2.3% of population that identified as Muslim by identifying as 
Kosovar Albanian. By 1991, the time of the next census, the Albanian population living in Serbia rose 
to close to 18 % of the population, plus the now increased 2.5 % of the population that then identified 
as Muslim according to their nationality. This means that before the beginning of the war over 20% of 
the population in Serbia was Muslim with the indication that this number would only continue to rise, 
based on similar rises in Muslim population in other republics, notably Macedonia, where the number 
of Albanians calling Macedonia home rose from 19% in 1981 to 22% in 1994, and more recently, in 
2002, to 25%, excluding the nearly 8% of other Muslim groups, such as Turks, Roma, Bosniaks, and 
those who identify as Muslim. In 2002, the religious demographics for Macedonia show that a third of 
the country's population identifies as Muslim. In the nationalist Serbian imaginary, Albanians are often 
taken to represent Islam in a more general sense, stemming from their frequent association with Ot-
toman Turk mentality. The fact that in the 1990s Albanian birth rates were more than double of Serbi-
an birthrates and the gap between them widening caused great alarm among Serbian nationalists, as 
well as the wider public who began to speak of an impending demographic disaster of tremendous 
proportions (see Lilly and Irvine 133). The urgent need for Serbian demographic renewal was illustrat-
ed paradoxically through the denigration of Muslim sexual and marital practices as not being depend-
ent on any form of birth control with the resulting perception voiced in some stereotypes that Muslims 
"multiply as rabbits" while Serbian women are allowed to choose to "murder their children" through 
liberal abortion laws. Stories of rapes committed by Albanians on Serbian women appeared alongside 
stories in the media promulgating the imminent disappearance of the Serbs owing to low birth rates. 
The first post-communist pluralist elections in 1990 brought to power conservative nationalist political 
parties whose platforms were marked by more or less open xenophobia and patriarchal agendas. As-
sociated with these agendas were political and legal challenges to women's rights of abortion in all 
former Yugoslav republics (see Papić 155). 
In response to the problem raised by national unrest in Kosovo, the new Serbian government 
raised the question of an imbalance in the population's demographic reproduction. The government 
pointed to a low fertility rate of 1.8 that was continuing to decline for Serbia and contrasted this with a 
high fertility rate of 4.3 for Kosovo with its Albanian majority (see Milić). Calls for action to raise fertili-
ty levels came from all key political players: the ruling Socialist Party, major opposition parties, the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. The message of the Ortho-
dox patriarch was aimed specifically at existing abortion laws which in his words amounted to "infanti-
cide" committed by women who refused to give birth to more Serbs and thus painted a picture of a 
nation under threat of diminishing and extinction. The major concern behind the initiatives to address 
demographic renewal was that if the low birthrate of Serbs and high birth-rate of Albanians, Muslims, 
and Roma remain unchanged, the Serbs would soon be outnumbered by other ethnic groups in their 
own country. The head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Pavle, addressed the issue in terms 
of an epidemic of the so-called "white plague," the South Slavic term for shrinking populations of 
Serbs and other majority groups. The Patriarch tried to impress upon Serbian women the importance 
of bearing more children, and that not doing so constitutes a threefold sin, toward themselves, toward 
the Serbian nation, and toward god (see Papić 161). On the more secular side, a document issued in 
1992 entitled "Warning on the Demographic Movements of the Serbian Population" signed by officials 
of public and national institutions proposed that a State Council of Population be established with the 
aim to address Serbian low birth rates. The document links this agenda to the escalating violence in 
Croatia and Bosnia stating that conflicts and "terror committed against the Serbs in Croatia and Bos-
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nia-Herzegovina" are taking a toll on the number of "potentially reproductive Serbian males" (see 
Papić 161). 
In 1993, the Bishop of Zvornik and Tuzla, Vasilije Kacavenda, also a cabinet minister in the gov-
ernment of the Republic of Srpska (the Serbian entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina), advocated for a 
complete ban on abortion in the Republic Srpska and suggested to the Holy Synod of the Serbian Or-
thodox Church to extend the ban to "all Serbian lands" because "today … many Serbian women kill 
their children. That is why the percentage of Serbian population decreases with every census. In to-
day's Serbia only 63 percent of the population are Serbs … If we listen to the advice of feminists and 
others who support the killing of unborn children, the new census will in a few years show that in Ser-
bia and everywhere where Serbs live this percentage is even lower. And this will go on until, God for-
bid, Serbs in Serbia become a minority and no longer live in their own country. Because of this state 
of affairs, Serbs have no right to blame others; they will be themselves to blame for their vanishing" 
(Kacavenda qtd. in Shiffman, Skrabalo, Subotic 11-12). Statements such as these made by prominent 
officials have been used to mobilize power and seem to issue a challenge to prevent what is repre-
sented as an imminent Serbian downfall from happening "again" by all means possible. Given that 
reports about the Bosnian rape camps circulated widely in world media at this time, it appears unlikely 
that this and other officials did not have any knowledge of what was going on inside them. Thus the 
forceful impregnation of Bosniak women can be seen as serving the Serbian cause on several levels: it 
avenges the wrongs done to Serbian mothers long ago during the period of Ottoman Turkish occupa-
tion and it diminishes the number of Muslim children born, while also ostensibly increasing the Serbian 
birth-rate through violent means. Many of the recorded narratives of women rape survivors indicate 
the way in which their religious, ethnic, and gender identity was conflated with that of past Serbian 
enemies. Hatiza, one of the women rape survivors recounted being told by the rapist, a former Serbi-
an acquaintance that "you'll have one of our kids in your belly" after being struck by guns in the 
mouth and having her clothes torn off, acts which were supposed to show their superiority to "the 
Turkish women" (Hatiza qtd. in Stiglmayer 92). Rape survivors Mirsada and Azra reported being told 
that they will give birth to Serbian children alongside hearing curses "Fuck your Turkish mother" and 
"Death to all Turkish sperm" (Mirsada and Azra qtd. in Stiglmayer 109). Senada's narrative reveals 
that from the beginning of her ordeal the rapists announced that she was going to have to bear a Ser-
bian child: "They told us how much they wanted to see us raise their kids, they sang rhymes with 
words like: 'A mother raises her baby, he's half a Muslim, half a Serb" (Senada qtd. in Stiglmayer 
132). Senada's words also point to the reality that in this case the perpetrators were constructing the 
identity of the child along the lines of a mixed background, but with the assumption that inflicting 
upon the child this state of not being purely one or the other was part of the revenge. 
In each narrative of ethnic nationhood women are products of a masculinist, nationalist strategy of 
representation, and doubly subjugated: as insiders they are colonized and instrumentalized in their 
natural reproductive function as mothers, and as outsiders they become "mediated instruments of 
violence against other men's nations and cultural identity" (Stiglmayer 155). In this sense, women's 
individual and biological capacity is circumscribed and used in the service of defining and policing im-
agined and real group boundaries. While reports about the Bosnian rape camps kept surfacing with 
increasing regularity in world media at this time, in May 1993 the Parliament of Serbia adopted a new-
ly articulated abortion law which does not allow personal, family, or social reasons to be considered as 
legal grounds for abortion after the tenth week of pregnancy nor does it allow women to make their 
own decisions after this period. The violence embedded in restricting the reproductive and legal rights 
of Serbian women in the name of a nationalist agenda finds an even uglier counterpart in the rape and 
enforced impregnation of Muslim women as the perceived enemy on the outside. Further, the psychol-
ogy of rape is such that the victim of rape is always objectified by the perpetrator(s), which to some 
extent accounts for the violence of the act itself. Here, however, I am interested in exploring the spe-
cific ways which enabled or may have led to particular forms of objectification and sexual violence 
Bosniak women suffered at the hands of Serbian military and paramilitary units, as well as the particu-
lar discourses which may have accounted for the rapists' statements that the Bosniak women will bear 
Serbian children. I suggest previously that the discourse of nationalist rape in Kosovo preceding the 
war, the wave of radical nationalism it engendered in Serbia, as well as the consequent re-
patriarchalization and archaization of women's roles and identities can be counted among the factors 
which helped create a particular kind of militarized and masculinist nationalism that led to the re-
striction of reproductive and other political rights for women in Serbia on the one hand and the rapes 
and impregnation of a great number of Bosniak women on the other. 
The reconfigured gender relations in Serbian nationalist ideology show that women occupy a dis-
tinct, symbolic role in nationalist culture, discourse, and collective action. Nira Yuval-Davies and Floya 
Anthias identify five ways in which women tend to participate in ethnic, nationalist, and state process-
es: 1) As biological producers of members of ethnic collectivities, 2) As reproducers of the (normative) 
boundaries of ethnic/national groups by enacting proper feminine behavior, 3) As participating central-
ly in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and transmitters of its culture, 4) As signifiers of 
ethnic and national differences, and 5) In smaller measure, as participants in national, economic and 
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military struggles (7-8). Yuval-Davies's and Anthias's theoretical framework can be modified to apply 
to the role Bosniak women were suffering through rape and impregnation. Bosniak women appeared 
as signifiers of ethnic, religious, and national difference for nationalist Serbs: the raping and impreg-
nating of Bosniak women represented a specifically gendered form of punishment on the Bosniak Mus-
lim population for freshly remembered past wrongs. Further, if we think of Bosniak women as repro-
ducers of boundaries of ethnic and national groups, their injunction to bear Serbian children break 
down and reinforces those boundaries: the boundaries are broken with the implication that they will 
be unable to reproduce their own identity and culture through these children and that they will be 
forced to reproduce in some patrilineal way the boundaries of Serbian national identity and thus act 
against their own. As biological producers of members of ethnic collectives through the act of rape and 
enforced impregnation, Bosniak women's membership to their own ethnic collective is hijacked and 
directed to the production of members of the Serbian nation. 
The enforced impregnations of Bosniak women were also a perverse acknowledgment of the wom-
en's central participation in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of that 
collectivity's culture: while giving birth to "Chetnik" babies perverts the women's ability to participate 
in the ideological reproduction and transmission of their own culture, it subsumes them under the 
Serbian nationalist banner where they appear to be unwilling participants in the reproduction and en-
forced transmission of the Serbian collective. While the perpetrators' intention behind impregnating 
Bosniak women through rape was motivated by the desire to perpetuate and increase the ethnic group 
of the aggressor in the cause of greater Serbia, it was also a way to restore what was constructed in 
nationalist discourse as the authentic and natural social and (hetero)sexual order of Serbian masculine 
and militant dominance and superiority over the Muslim population. In addition, it was a way to repos-
sess, achieve, and assert a newly reclaimed Serbian nationalist masculinity in which traditional man-
hood was redefined through a nationalist dimension and perspective. In the years preceding and dur-
ing the war, Serbian political, nationalist, and gender discourses intertwine and transmute into a sort 
of "Oriental" despotism produced by Milošević and his supporters, a style of governance designed to 
dominate, restructure, and have authority over territories inhabited by mainly Muslim populations 
reconstructed along historical and legendary lines. Thus, the discursive contiguity between woman and 
nation in radical nationalist discourse in South Europe, alongside the revival of long standing religious-
ly and politically motivated animosity and prejudice against Muslims, can be counted among the con-
stitutive socio-political and cultural factors which enabled the violent and systematic targeting of Bos-
niak women's status as mothers.  
There exist, however, an inherent paradox and historical irony in the endeavor to impregnate Bos-
niak women with Serb children who will later hate them and supposedly contribute to the destruction 
of the Bosniak community. The paradox and irony are that the act of enforced impregnation, while 
intended to produce and reinforce the boundaries of one ethnic or nationalist group, in fact results in 
the opposite: in ethnic and national mixing, the kind of which was performed under Tito's Yugoslavia. 
Again, it is not the "mixing" itself that constitutes a problem, but the social perception of that mixing 
and the discursive inflection that society ascribes to it. A number of young people born of wartime 
rape live in the mothers' communities suffering victimization and rejection owing to their "impure" 
identity. Six out of eleven interviewed adolescent girls identified themselves as scapegoats: "I see 
myself as a scapegoat because I have Serbian blood, and in this way, I am kind of … available for 
everyone to hate me" (Zerina) and "children and their mothers shouting at me and after me that I am 
a Chetnik or a whore child" (Lejla), "I have nothing to do with the Serbs. I hate them too, but every-
one sees a little Chetnik in me" (Jasenka), and "Since I know who my father is, I feel dirty. Dirty on 
the inside, so I can't clean myself enough" (Satka) (Zerina, Lejla, Jasenka qtd. in Erjavec and Volčič, 
367-73). At the same time, a small minority of the children in fact construct themselves in their own 
recorded narratives as "peace builders" due to their "ethnically mixed blood," and as someone who 
can help "bring people closer," feeling it is their duty to speak about "injustices and continuing strug-
gles" (Erjavec and Volčič 377-78). Said paradoxical perception and thus contrary to the nationalist 
Serb objective is exemplified in one raped woman's voice as follows: since she has "ethnically mixed 
blood" Seada feels she can help to stop ethnic conflicts so that "we can all start to talk: I see myself 
as a rescuer, as someone who can connect enemies … Having blood of both sides in me, Bosniak and 
Serbian, it is my duty to speak out … We all have to make sure this does not happen again … We have 
to assure there will be no repletion of these acts of violence again" (Seada qt.d in Erjavec and Volčič 
378-79). Seada's words provide an alternative discursive construction of ethnically mixed identity, one 
that is positive as it is uniquely positioned to mediate peace between warring factions. While at this 
time Bosnian society remains divided along ethnic lines and it is difficult to speculate about the possi-
bility for peaceful coexistence among the groups, narratives by the children born of wartime rape offer 
some hope that there may be a way to contextualize the past through lived experience and overcome 
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